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5 The Speaker and the Budget 
Daniel J. Palazzolo 
The Speakers of the House, from Carl Albert to Tom Foley, have faced various challenges in the budgetary process since the passage of the Bud-
get Act in 1974. That act required the Congress to fix budget targets in authori-
zations and outlays in each of thirteen functional categories for each fiscal year 
and to reconcile annual authorizations and appropriations to those targets. It 
created separate budget committees in each chamber and altered the legislative 
process in an attempt to enforce budget discipline. Some challenges have been 
defined by the individual Speakers themselves; others have emerged from in-
stitutional changes in the budget process, large deficits, and the political con-
text within which budget decisions have been made. Speaker Albert's primary 
challenge was to meet the formal guidelines of the new budget process. Under 
Speaker Tip O'Neill, the task of facilitating the formal procedures of the Bud-
get Act gave way to managing various forms of conflict over budget priorities, 
representing the House majority party in negotiations with Senate leaders and 
the president, and acting as a spokesperson for the Democratic party. Speaker 
Jim Wright used the budget resolution to define the priorities of the Demo-
cratic party. Speaker Foley's major challenge has been to facilitate passage of 
two major deficit reduction bills, first under a divided government in which 
opposing parties controlled the Congress and the White House and then un-
der the leadership of President Bill Clinton. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, the Speaker of the House is a leader 
who represents three different interests-institutional, party, and personal. As 
an institutional leader the Speaker is expected to carry out the duties of presid-
ing officer and facilitate the legislative process in a fair, efficient, and impartial 
fashion. As the party's primary leader, the Speaker tries to mediate intra-party 
conflict over policy preferences, build coalitions in support of the majority 
party's position, and assist the president in passing legislation if the president 
is of the same party as the Speaker. If the president is of the opposite party, the 
Speaker acts as a national spokesperson and representative of the House ma-
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jority party's interests. Finally, all Speakers have personal interests in repre-
senting their electoral constituencies and their own policy preferences. This 
chapter evaluates the strategies Speakers have adopted to deal with the major 
challenges in the budget process and discusses how those challenges have af-
fected the Speaker's three major interests. 
Looking to the Past: 
The Budget Process under Four Speakers 
The challenges to leadership in the budget process have made it difficult for 
each Speaker to balance institutional, partisan, and personal interests. When 
the interests are incompatible, a Speaker's strategies for dealing with the chal-
lenges reveals which of the three interests the Speaker considers most impor-
tant. The Speaker's strategies, in turn, affect how the budget process operates. 
Each Speaker's capacity to deal with a challenge depends on how compatible 
the Speaker's interests are with the challenges. Speaker Albert was ideally 
suited for facilitating the budget process in its early years, but he was not in-
clined to use the budget resolution to formulate the majority party's priorities. 
After 1981, Speaker O'Neill succeeded in blocking attempts by President Ron-
ald Reagan and congressional Republicans to cut domestic spending-but at a 
cost to the formal procedures of the budget process. Speaker Wright was very 
effective in using the budget resolution to advance his priorities, but he was 
accused of acting unfairly to the minority party. Speaker Foley's attempt to 
reach a bipartisan solution to the deficit problem in 1990 reflected his belief 
that it was the only way to pass a deficit reduction bill with a Republican in the 
White House, yet some House Democrats thought he had abandoned the par-
ty's principles in the process. 
Carl Albert: The Budget Act and the In$titutional Speaker 
Speaker Albert presided over the first two years of the new budget process, 
1975-1976.1 Albert's central challenge was to help guide the budget process 
through its formative stages, and his strategies reflected his institutional inter-
est in making the budget process work according to the formal guidelines of 
the Budget Act. The strategy involved explaining the complex procedures of 
the Budget Act to participants in the new budget process, organizing the com-
mittees for action, and moderating fears about the uncertain potential of the 
Budget Act. Although his successors would take on more political challenges, 
Albert played a key role in implementing formal budget procedures at a time 
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when the success of the new process was by no means certain. 
Albert's final two years in office followed a period of major institutional 
reform that simultaneously attempted to broaden the participation of the 
members and integrate the decentralized and fragmented committee system in 
the House. One objective of the Budget Act was to coordinate the various 
authorization, appropriations, and revenue decisions made by the Congress. 
Yet participatory reforms complicated efforts to coordinate legislative activity 
by opening up the legislative process and allowing more members to partici-
pate in key decisions at the subcommittee level and on the floor.2 The House 
needed a patient and skillful Speaker to move the House from a long period of 
committee government to a wide open, but-it was hoped-a more efficient, 
legislative body. 
In transition periods, leaders often struggle to accommodate conflicting 
expectations about the course and relative speed of change.3 As Speaker Albert 
entered his final two years in office, newer members wanted the reforms im-
plemented quickly, while senior members preferred gradual change.4 Even 
though Albert tried to accommodate both views, he was not supported wholly 
by all factions of the Democratic party. Seventy-five first-term Democrats 
elected in 197 4 created most of the Speaker's problems. These members were 
intensely independent and eager to participate in the legislative process. The 
first-term members did not hesitate to complain to Speaker Albert about his 
failure to initiate creative policy proposals and control committee chairs.5 
In the context of these major political and institutional changes, Speaker 
Albert took on the challenge of executing the Budget Act when Congress put 
the process through its first trial run in 1975. Albert's action reflected both his 
personal commitment to the new budget process and his institutional respon-
sibility to assist th~ House with the formal procedures established by the Bud-
get Act. Fortunately for the new budget process, Albert identified his role and 
ably performed the functions associated with guiding the process through its 
formative stages. 
One of Albert's most important tasks was explaining to House members the 
new budget procedures and purpose of the Budget Act. In early March, after 
the House was organized to begin the 94th Congress, Albert and Brock Adams 
(D-Wash.), Chair of the House Budget Committee, met with all the standing 
committee chairs and Appropriations subcommittee chairs. Richard Bolling 
(D-Mo.), former representative and a major player in the enactment of budget 
reform, described the meeting: 
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... Albert did an incredible job of organizing the leadership of the committees for the 
transition into the new budget process. In 1975, after we organized the committees, he 
had a meeting of all the committee chairmen with regard to the Budget Act and it was a 
phenomenal experience. These guys had all voted for it, it had been going on for about 
six months, and they didn't know the first thing about the Budget Act. One of them 
knew a little. So, quite obviously, if it wasn't for the Speaker there wasn't going to be 
any Budget Act. It wasn't going to last.6 
Adams credited Speaker Albert for expanding the purpose and limitations of 
the new process: 
The Speaker was incredibly important in communicating the idea that the [Budget] 
Committee was not designed to compete with the other committees in the House. He 
wanted to make clear and carry out the view that the first resolution was a planning 
tool, a response, an alternative to the president's budget.7 
Albert did not intend to use the budget resolution to challenge the Repub-
lican president's budget or to initiate particular budget priorities. The Speak-
er's primary concern was to pass a budget resolution on schedule, an objective 
he emphasized on the House floor during the first debate on a budget reso-
lution: 
Mr. Chairman, I do not take this time to comment on the amendments either pending 
or prospective .... I am not attempting to make a brief for any particular provision or 
position. Nevertheless, I must assert, as the elected leader of the House, on behalf of this 
House and the future of the Nation, that it is essential that we pass a budget resolution, 
and that we finish our procedures within the time contemplated in the act itself. For 
only by supporting a budget resolution can we continue the development of the vitally 
important overall budgetary process in this Congress.8 
The House passed the budget resolution by a vote of 200 to 196. 
Thus, Albert rose to the first major challenge of the Speaker in the budget 
process: making a credible effort to pass a budget. In Albert's view, "If we 
didn't make it [the budget process J work we were going to be the laughing 
stock." 9 As the House accepted the responsibility of enacting its own budget, 
Albert was committed to getting the process started. Albert preferred Sam Ray-
burn's style of meeting in small groups or individually with committee chairs. 
His extensive and cordial relationships with most members enabled him to 
implement that style effectively. 10 Adams credited Albert for guiding the pro-
cess in its earliest stages: "The Speaker, at that time, was a primary moving 
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force in the budget process, a great factor in making the budget process 
successful." 11 
Tip O'Neill: The Emergence of Partisan 
and Personal Interests 
Speaker O'Neill witnessed more changes and encountered more challenges 
in the budget process than any of the Speakers since the passage of the Budget 
Act. During the Carter years, House Democrats were intensely divided over 
budget priorities, and Speaker O'Neill worked to build support for the Budget 
Committee's resolutions. In 1981, the problem of unifying House Democrats 
peaked as President Reagan skillfully built a coalition of Republicans and con-
servative Democrats and wrested control of the budget process from the ma-
jority party in the House. After 1982, party unity on roll call votes increased 
substantially, making it easier for the Speaker to solidify coalitions in support 
of the Budget Committee's resolution. Yet large deficits, divided government, 
and intense partisanship created havoc in the budget process. The formal pro-
cedures of the Budget Act were substituted regularly by informal, ad hoc ar-
rangements for addressing the deficit. Ultimately, Congress passed a wholesale 
revision of the Budget Act with the Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act of 
1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings). That law sought to put teeth into the bud-
get process by requiring that if the budget outlay levels were exceeded in broad 
functional categories of national defense and discretionary domestic spending, 
the spending spigot would be closed by automatically sequestering funds 
across the board. This led to intense conflicts over budget priorities. Speaker 
O'Neill's challenges shifted from facilitating an orderly process to representing 
and protecting Democratic budget priorities. As the period progressed, the 
Speaker's partisan and personal policy preferences superseded his institutional 
interests. 
In the late 1970s, O'Neill's institutional and partisan interests were gener-
ally compatible. The Speaker continued to stress the importance of passing 
resolutions on schedule, and since the Democrats had a majority in both 
chambers and control of the presidency, it was in the party's interests for the 
institution to perform as expected. But the party was divided along ideological 
lines. Speaker O'Neill was often quoted as saying that the Democratic party 
was really "five parties in one .... We've got about 25 really strong liberals, 110 
progressive liberals, maybe 60 moderates, about 45 people just to the right of 
the moderates, and about 35 conservatives." 12 
O'Neill used two mechanisms for dealing with weak party cohesion-the 
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Speaker's task forces and an expanded whip system.13 Both devices involved 
more members in the legislative process, improved communication between 
the members and the leadership, and facilitated coalitiop. building. And both 
techniques corresponded with O'Neill's conception of leadership: to provide 
avenues for broad participation and to recognize the diverse ideological per-
spectives in the Democratic party. O'Neill used a classic "middleman" leader-
ship strategy to build coalitions among the members of the party. He listened 
to members and mediated differences between the factions of the party. At the 
same time, O'Neill maintained an intense commitment to traditional New 
Deal and Great Society programs. Thus, his two major challenges during the 
Carter years were to reconcile ideological differences between House Demo-
crats and to balance his personal commitment to preserve traditional Demo-
cratic programs with his responsibility to build winning coalitions for the Bud-
get Committee's resolutions. 
O'Neill struggled to keep the party together on numerous occasions. In 
1977, the first year of O'Neill's speakership, the House initially failed to pass 
the fiscal 1978 first budget resolution. The biggest problem was a mismatch 
between the priorities of the liberal Democrats on the House Budget Commit-
tee and the House Democratic party as a whole. Conservative Democrats dis-
agreed with the Budget Committee's decision to cut President Jimmy Carter's 
defense budget by $4.1 billion. The Budget Committee's resolution failed, and 
the House passed an amendment by Omar Burleson (D-Texas) to restore Car-
ter's original defense estimate. A second attempt at passing the budget resolu-
tion succeeded after the Budget Committee redrafted the original budget reso-
lution to include a larger defense budget. 
In 1980, congressional leaders worked with President Carter to develop a 
deficit reduction plan and use reconciliation procedures to enforce spending 
cuts and tax increases. The budget resolution based on those meetings in-
cluded $6.4 billion in spending cuts. O'Neill reluctantly accepted the budget 
resolution, though he did not actively lobby for it, and the House passed the 
budget resolution with bipartisan support. But after a conference with the Sen-
ate produced an increase in defense spending in exchange for more domestic 
spending cuts, O'Neill publicly denounced the plan, stating, "The budget goes 
against my philosophy." 14 The House rejected the conference budget by a vote 
of 141 to 245. 
After Budget Committee Chair Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.), Senate Budget 
Committee Chair Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), and President Carter worked 
out a compromise that reduced defense spending by $800 million and added 
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$1.3 billion for domestic programs, O'Neill became involved fully in the pro-
cess. He instructed the Steering and Policy Committee to emphasize that the 
vote on the compromise was a party issue; he met with deputy and at-large 
whips to develop a strategy for building support for the budget resolution; 
he sent a letter to all House Democrats stating that failure to vote for the 
resolution would discredit the party; and he set up a task force to mobilize 
support on the floor. 15 The House approved the conference report by a vote of 
237 to 161. 
One year later, the political climate changed dramatically and so did the 
Speaker's ability to build a winning coalition in support of the Budget Com-
mittee's first budget resolution. In 1981, President Reagan rode the wave of a 
convincing electoral victory that gave the Republicans control over the Senate 
and a gain of thirty-four House seats. The president exploited the divisions 
within the House Democratic party, and recruited southern Democrats to join 
with House Republicans to pass four major budget bills: the fiscal 1982 first 
budget resolution; an omnibus reconciliation bill including major cuts in do-
mestic programs; a three-year tax plan providing tax breaks for individuals 
and depreciation allowances for businesses; and additional spending reduc-
tions in an omnibus appropriations bill.16 We will focus on the passage of the 
first budget resolution, which illustrates the Speaker's strategy for dealing with 
a fractionalized party and allows evaluation of his performance as a party lead-
er in a divided government. 
In the early stages of the budget process in 1981, O'Neill's strategy reflected 
his middleman style of leadership and his institutional responsibility as 
Speaker. The strategy was to accommodate as many members of the party as 
possible so that the House Budget Committee could pass a Democratic budget 
that offered a reasonable alternative to the president's budget. O'Neill placated 
conservative Democrats who sought more representation on the Budget Com-
mittee and significant increases in defense spending. Meanwhile, O'Neill oper-
ated under the assumption that while the president was popular, his election 
was based more on the public's dissatisfaction with Carter than on a mandate 
for Reagan's conservative economic philosophy. O'Neill thought that the pres-
ident deserved a fair opportunity to make a case for his program, but the 
Speaker assumed that the public would reject Reagan's proposals to cut gov-
ernment programs. O'Neill took a low profile in the early stages of the budget 
process. Rather than publicly attack the president, he contacted interest 
groups, requested committees to study Reagan's budget proposals, encouraged 
the media to expose the specific programs Reagan planned to cut, and pro-
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moted a floor amendment by Bill Hefner (D-N.C.) that would add $6.6 billion 
to the Budget Committee's estimate for defense spending.17 
Yet when the House voted for the first time ever to reject the House Budget 
Committee's resolution and proceeded to approve the president's plan, 
House Democrats criticized the Speaker's strategy.18 Liberal Democrats 
complained that Phil Gramm (D-Texas) should never have been appointed 
to the Budget Committee. Gramm had deserted the party and worked with 
David Stockman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Del-
bert Latta (Ohio), ranking Republican on the Budget Committee, to develop 
an alternative to the Budget Committee's resolution. Other Democrats criti-
cized O'Neill for taking a trip to Australia for two weeks while Reagan was 
developing public support for his budget. Budget Committee Chair Jim Jones 
(D-Okla.) was startled when on his return O'Neill announced that public 
opinion in favor of the president was so strong that it was not worth fighting 
against the president's plan. Finally, many Democrats wondered why the 
Speaker did not appoint a task force to build support for the Budget Commit-
tee's resolution. 
In retrospect, most of the charges were hurled in frustration and were exag-
gerated. Gramm was appointed to the Budget Committee on the promise that 
ultimately he would support the party leadership. When Gramm broke his 
promise and began working with Stockman he was barred from attending the 
Democratic Budget Committee caucus meetings. O'Neill's trip to Australia 
was planned two years before the budget was taken up by the House. Finally, a 
task force seemed unnecessary in this case, because members had already made 
up their minds prior to the vote.19 
It was probably a valid criticism of O'Neill to complain that he conceded 
victory to Reagan before the budget even reached the floor. Part of the Speak-
er's role as the opposition party leader is to defend his or her party's position. 
Even in the face of defeat, the Speaker would have better served the party by 
publicly supporting the Budget Committee's plan. O'Neill himselflater admit-
ted that he had underestimated the president's popularity and ability to gener-
ate support for his program. He said he "wasn't prepared for what happened 
in 1981." 20 Still, one could argue reasonably that O'Neill's apparent blunders 
only became significant within the broader context of Reagan's impressive 
electoral victory, popular economic plan, and effective White House opera-
tion. R€agan's grassroots lobbying campaign was particularly successful in re-
cruiting the votes of southern Democrats from districts in which Reagan ran 
ahead of Carter in the 1980 election.21 
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For Speaker O'Neill, 1981 was a defining moment in terms of how he would 
approach budget politics. He would no longer trust the president, and he per-
ceived budget politics as a battle over fundamental principles. As Democratic 
party unity improved in the 1980s, the challenge of passing budget resolutions 
on the floor was replaced by efforts to define the party's priorities and protect 
traditional Democratic programs from being cut in the midst oflarge deficits. 
O'Neill continued to play the middleman role, but his main personal objective 
was to block further domestic spending cuts, even if it meant stalling the pro-
cess altogether. A top staff member of O'Neill's reflected on the Speaker's 
commitment to maintain and, when possible, to restore the programs Reagan 
sought to cut: 
It is a tribute to O'Neill's management of the process, that under extraordinarily ad-
verse circumstances, when all the pressures were to cut and to get people to vote for 
programs to help poor people was impossible, he managed to build them back up .... 
He would literally hold up final agreement on a reconciliation bill over one AFDC 
provision or one Medicaid provision.22 
Several•examples illustrate the point. In 1982, O'Neill used his scheduling 
powers to oppose an omnibus reconciliation bill similar to the one passed by 
the House in 1981. When House Republicans sought a rule to block floor 
amendments to the reconciliation bill, O'Neill said, "We're not going to allow 
ourselves to be put in that position again." 23 O'Neill announced, for example, 
that the Post Office and Civil Service Committee was not bound to follow 
instructions in the first budget resolution to make a 4 percent cap on cost-of-
living adjustments (COLA) to civil service pensions. When the committee ig-
nored the instructions, O'Neill said the spending cut could be achieved if the 
House voted for a separate amendment on the floor. The House approved a 
rule that would allow the Republicans to restore the cut, but the Republicans 
decided against the amendment, fearing the adverse political consequences of 
proposing a reduction in a popular entitlement. 
In 1983, as the government was on the verge of shutting down for lack of 
appropriations by Congress, O'Neill held hostage a continuing resolution in 
order to pass a $98.7 million package of social welfare benefits. O'Neill exalted: 
"We showed them that we had a definite means of being able to stop the 
further cutting of the safety net." 24 
In 1984, O'Neill blocked a Senate Republican plan to impose caps on both 
domestic and defense spending. O'Neill described the purpose of the Demo-
cratic strategy in reference to attempts to cut Democratic programs: "We want 
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to stop the course of the [Reagan] administration. We're trying to stop them 
from turning back the clock." 25 The conference deliberations remained dead-
locked until the Congress was forced to pass an extension of the ceiling on total 
federal debt. As part of the compromise to pass the debt ceiling, the conferees 
agreed to drop the caps in the reconciliation bill. 
In 1985, the House and Senate were deadlocked for two months over the 
Senate's provision to freeze COLAs for social security at the prevailing rate of 
inflation. O'Neill publicly announced, "I am bitterly opposed [to the cap on 
the COLA for social security] and I will so notify and instruct my conferees." 26 
Later, President Reagan asked if O'Neill would accept a cap on the COLAs in 
exchange for a reduction in the defense budget; O'Neill recalls responding, "I 
can't go along with this reduction on the COLAs. You can be assured that it's 
never going to go through the House." 27 Ultimately, the president agreed with 
O'Neill that the COLA should be retained, and the Speaker won another vic-
tory in blocking Republican efforts to cut social security benefits. 
By placing partisan policy objectives over formal procedures, O'Neill 
helped to perpetuate the delays and breakdowns that had become a standard 
feature of budget process during the 1980s. 
Jim Wright: Policy Commitments and Partisanship 
If O'Neill's major challenge was to protect and defend traditional Demo-
cratic programs, his successor, Wright, sought to propose and advance budget 
priorities.28 As one Budget Committee staff person remarked, Wright was an 
"unrelenting activist" in the budget process.29 Wright's aggressive leadership 
style served him well in formulating the fiscal 1988 first budget resolution. At 
the beginning of his first year as Speaker (1987), Wright defined the chal-
lenge-to reduce the deficit and shift priorities from defense to domestic social 
programs. Yet before the year ended, Speaker Wright experienced the limita-
tions to activist, policy-oriented leadership in the House. And, while Wright 
was very effective when the conditions called for decisive action, he was criti-
cized for acting too hastily in situations that required patience.30 
Wright ascended to the speakership in 1986 under conditions that appeared 
to be favorable to "strong, policy-oriented leadership." 31 The Democrats had 
just recaptured the Senate in the 1986 elections, House Democrats were dem-
onstrating unprecedented levels of party cohesion on roll call votes, and Presi-
dent Reagan was damaged publicly by the Iran-Contra scandal and the lame-
duck status typically associated with a president's final two years in office. The 
new Speaker took advantage of those conditions by leading the House Budget 
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Committee to formulate a budget resolution that attempted to reduce the defi-
cit and shift spending priorities from defense to domestic programs. Wright's 
package included an $18 billion increase in tax revenues, an $18 billion cut in 
defense spending, and $1.45 billion in new spending for domestic social 
programs. 
Never before had a Speaker used the budget process as an instrument for 
defining his own agenda, let alone a budget that included tax increases. Many 
House Democrats were skeptical about proposing a tax increase while Presi-
dent Reagan promised to veto any bills that increased taxes. But Wright be-
lieved that revenue increases were necessary in order to meet the deficit ceiling 
of $108 billion for fiscal year 1988 under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law. 
At the same time, he wanted the party to endorse new spending for welfare 
reform, health care for the elderly, homeless assistance, AIDS research, drug 
prevention, and job training. Wright personally lobbied Budget Committee 
Democrats and the Democratic Caucus to support his budget priorities.32 The 
budget passed with a straight party-line vote in the Budget Committee and was 
approved by the House by a vote of 230 to 192, with all the Republicans and 
only nineteen Democrats voting against the resolution. 
As the budget resolution moved on to further stages of the budget process, 
Wright's objectives were to preserve the major provisions of the House-passed 
budget resolution and to keep intact the coalition of Democrats who passed 
the resolution. The Speaker was only partially successful. Wright's budget was 
modified in conference deliberations with the Senate and was altered signifi-
cantly by the reconciliation process and in negotiations with the president. 
The first crack in Wright's coalition came during conference deliberations 
with the Senate, though his priorities generally survived. The main controversy 
was over defense spending. The Senate's budget resolution included about 
$13 billion more for defense spending than the House, and liberal Democrats 
in the House were decidedly against the Senate's defense figure. After several 
weeks of negotiations, Speaker Wright and Senate leaders agreed to a budget 
resolution that contained a contingency clause for the defense budget. The 
budget would include the Senate's defense recommendation under the as-
sumption that the president would sign a bill containing $19.3 billion in new 
tax revenues. The House approved the conference plan, but by a much nar-
rower margin than the original budget resolution. The vote was 215 to 201, as 
thirty-four Democrats voted against the conference version of the resolution. 
Wright's budget package began to unravel when the House took up the 
reconciliation bill that would attempt to translate the recommendations of the 
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budget resolution into law. The reconciliation bill consisted of $23 billion in 
deficit reduction, with roughly half coming from spending cuts and half from 
new taxes. The bill also contained a package of welfare benefits, the so-called 
Downey package, that embodied Wright's priorities in the original budget 
resolution. The package, including a measure that would require states to ex-
tend eligibility for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram to two-parent families in which the primary wage earner was unem-
ployed, would cost the federal government $148 million in fiscal year 1988 and 
$1.7 billion over three years. Southern Democrats objected to the mix of taxes 
and spending cuts in the reconciliation bill plus the AFDC mandate on the 
states. Buddy MacKay (D-Fla.), described the problem for southern Demo-
crats: "It's [the reconciliation bill] got two lightning rod issues [taxes and wel-
fare]; both of which are career threatening in the South .... " 33 Wright suf-
fered his first major defeat when the House defeated the rule on the 
reconciliation bill by a vote of 203 to 217; forty-eight Democrats (thirty-two 
from the South) voted against the bill. 
The aftermath of this vote is described in Chapters 4 and 11. By forceful 
action Speaker Wright was able to reverse his defeat and pass the budget. 
However, the original package was compromised even further by a budget 
summit agreement between the president and Congress. The summit pro-
duced a two-year budget plan, including a total of $76 billion in deficit 
reduction, that set the guidelines for the final reconciliation bill and the omni-
bus appropriation bill for fiscal year 1988. As the curtain closed on Speaker 
Wright's first year, he found himself relying on Republican votes to pass 
both of those bills.34 And, though he succeeded in getting President Reagan 
to sign a bill that raised $9 billion in taxes, it was half of what the 
Speaker originally wanted. . 
Speaker Wright deserves credit for taking on the challenge of trying to raise 
taxes to reduce the deficit and defining a Democratic agenda during the final 
two years of the Reagan administration. Yet his aggressive style was not always 
consistent with the expectations of House members. The results of Wright's 
activist leadership reflect both the impressive potential of the Speaker's office 
and the limitations to strong, policy-oriented leadership in the House. 
Tom Foley: Balancing Institutional and Partisan Interests 
Compared with Wright and O'Neill, Foley has been a much less partisan 
Speaker. He has not yet attempted to push his own policy agenda, and he has 
not engaged in the sort of partisan combat waged by his predecessors. Foley 
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expressed reservations about the partisan element of the opposition party 
leader role that he assumed during the Bush administration: "I was not elected 
primarily to be the campaign manager of the next Democratic President. I 
don't see my job that way." 35 House Democrats have occasionally criticized 
Foley's nonpartisan style, which seems out of context in the highly partisan, 
contentious atmosphere that has pervaded budget politics. Foley acknowl-
edges and ignores his critics: "There are people who think I should be more 
partisan, should be more aggressive, should be more combative. More hard-
edged .... I don't tend to agree with them." 36 Thus, Foley's speakership has 
restored an interest in institutional leadership combined with a weaker com-
mitment to partisan interests, and what appears to be almost no interest in 
pursuing personal policy preferences. 
Speaker Foley's major challenges in the budget process have been to help 
pass the two largest deficit reduction plans in history. In both cases he has 
acted as a consensus builder rather than an advocate for a particular set of 
priorities. After Foley suffered an embarrassing defeat on the 1990 bipartisan 
budget summit agreement, he helped to pass a Democratic-sponsored budget 
and reconciliation bill later that year. In 1993, he served as an able lieutenant 
of President Clinton's budget plan and reconciliation bill in the House. He 
also played an instrumental role in lobbying House Democrats to support the 
conference version of the reconciliation bill. 
In January 1990, President George Bush submitted a budget that recom-
mended $36 billion in deficit reduction to meet the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
deficit ceiling of $64 billion for fiscal year 1991. By April, however, as the 
House Budget Committee deliberated over the first budget resolution, OMB 
Director Richard Darman announced that the administration had underesti-
mated the size of the deficit, and at least $50 billion more in spending cuts or 
revenue increases would be needed to avoid sequestration. Despite Darman's 
warning, Budget Committee Democrats decided to stick with Bush's original 
budget assumptions and wait for the president to recommend a way to achieve 
the additional $50 billion in deficit reduction. Speaker Foley expressed the 
position of House Democrats, who were unwilling to let the administration off 
the hook: "The first action has to be taken by the president. First, with the 
president, then with us." 37 
Recognizing that a sequestration order of at least $50 billion would force 
deep cuts in defense spending, President Bush called a meeting with congres-
sional leaders on May 6 to talk about a process for negotiating a deficit reduc-
tion deal with "no preconditions." Just three days later, however, Bush's Chief 
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of Staff John Sununu stated that "no preconditions" meant the Democrats 
could propose new taxes if they wanted. Sununu's statement confirmed the 
suspicions of House Democrats who believed Bush's invitation to negotiate 
with House leaders was a political ploy to get the Democrats to initiate a tax 
increase as part of a deficit reduction package. While Foley was open to negoti-
ations with the White House, many House Democrats distrusted Bush and 
Darman and were opposed to bipartisan talks. The leadership decided to adopt 
a "go slow" strategy in which Foley insisted that the president must publicly 
acknowledge the need to increase taxes before the Democrats would go 
along.38 This strategy gave Bush an opening to accept a tax increase without 
alienating House Democrats. 
On June 26, after weeks of ambiguity about the president's intentions to 
revoke his campaign pledge of no new taxes and propose a tax increase, 
Speaker Foley told Bush: "If you issue this statement [on the need for taxes] 
we'll agree with it." 39 Following the meeting, Bush made a televised address 
stating the need to increase revenues as part of a deficit reduction plan, and 
Foley backed the president at a press conference following the speech. The 
Speaker said the Democrats were not interested in scoring political points for 
persuading the president to abandon his "read my lips, no new taxes" cam-
paign pledge. Foley stated, "I think it's important that neither political party 
attempt to make political capital out of serious bipartisan efforts to reach a 
budget agreement." 40 
From that point, the budget moved sluggishly through a series of summit 
meetings involving congressional leaders and White House officials. After fail-
ing to reach agreement in August, a group of twenty-three lawmakers took 
refuge for ten days of private talks at Andrews Air Force base in early Septem-
ber. But a dispute over the president's proposal for a capital gains tax cut 
undermined chances for a final agreement. As the beginning of the fiscal year 
approached (October 1), and the threat of an $85 billion sequester became 
more likely, bipartisan talks continued in Speaker Foley's office, this time with 
a much smaller group of eight people. On September 30, the group reached a 
budget agreement that would be debated and voted on by the House. It was a 
five-year, $500 billion deficit reduction package that reduced discretionary 
spending by $182.4 billion, cut Medicare by $60 billion, and raised $163 billion 
from a host of excise taxes, including gasoline, tobacco, alcohol, and luxury 
items. 
But the leaders of the summit recognized that the compromise agreement 
faced an uphill battle from the day it was announced. President Bush admitted, 
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"Sometimes you don't get it the way you want, and this is such a time for me." 
Speaker Foley noted, "This isn't the kind of thing the political system wants to 
go racing out in the streets [about] and saying, 'Joy! Joy!'" 41 It did not take 
long for members to attack the budget and the process used to formulate it. 
Members of both parties condemned the closed, secretive talks of the summit 
that prohibited them from having any input. Conservative House Republi-
cans, led by Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) argued that the plan in-
cluded too many taxes and would stifle economic growth. Liberal Democrats 
complained that the excise taxes were regressive and that reductions in the 
earned income tax credit, delays in unemployment benefits, and increases in 
Medicare deductibles and premiums were unfair. 
Nevertheless, the leaders of both parties attempted to garner a majority of 
members from their respective caucuses. On the Democratic side, early whip 
counts showed very little enthusiasm for the budget. Speaker Foley tried to 
persuade committee chairs to vote in favor of the budget resolution on the 
premise that they could change specific aspects of the plan in the reconciliation 
process. He made the same appeal to the Democratic Caucus on the morning 
of the vote. Finally, in a dramatic end to a long day of debate on the floor, 
Foley spoke to the House. He described the problem of large deficits; he urged 
members to look beyond partisan politics; and he reminded them again that 
passing the budget resolution was only the beginning of the process. Foley 
stated: "The president said today to me, and I repeated to the press, that it was 
our conviction ... that many of the policies established in the budget agree-
ment were for illustrative purposes only, and that the legislative committees 
had the right as well as the obligation to consider alternative policies to achieve 
similar savings." 42 
Despite the Speaker's efforts, the House rejected the budget resolution by a 
vote of 179 to 254. Foley's strategy of trying to mobilize the committee chairs 
was unsuccessful. Only fourteen of the twenty-seven Democratic C')mmittee 
chairs and only seven of the thirteen subcommittee chairs of the Appropria-
tions Committee voted for the budget. His plea to pass the budget resolution 
so that the House committees could work out the details of the deficit reduc-
tion plan alarmed House Republicans, who believed the reconciliation bill 
would be even less appealing to them than the budget resolution. Once it was 
clear that a majority of Republicans would vote against the plan, previously 
undecided Democrats also had reason to vote against it. 
Some Democrats saw the vote on the budget resolution as a referendum on 
Foley's leadership. Foley's critics charged that he was too willing to compro-
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mise the party's principles in order to close a deal with the president. Liberal 
Democrats, in particular, were surprised that the Speaker expected them to 
vote for a bill that contained severe cuts in social programs and regressive 
taxes. The fact that they were not consulted in the process added insult to 
injury. 
Yet Foley believed the vote was as much a failure of bipartisan cooperation 
in an era of intense partisan politics as a failure of his leadership strategy. The 
Speaker knew it would be difficult to sell the package to House Democrats and 
he personally did not like all aspects of the summit package. But he also knew 
that a strictly Democratic alternative would not have passed in the Senate. The 
Speaker thought if the Republicans could produce a majority on their side, 
then a majority of House Democrats would also go along, if only because they 
feared that voters would be even more angry if they had done nothing.43 
In the last analysis, although Foley lost the battle over the summit budget, 
he helped to win the war for the Democrats. House Democrats were able to 
regroup and pass their own budget resolution just three days after the summit 
agreement failed. The new plan stripped many of the controversial provisions 
in the summit bill and turned over the legislative details to the committees. 
Throughout the next month, as Democrats from both chambers worked 
through conference negotiations, Foley played an essentially mediating role 
between House and Senate Democrats. Eventually the Congress and the presi-
dent agreed to a budget that included a 3 percent increase in the highest mar-
ginal rate of taxation; excise taxes on alcohol, fuel, and tobacco; caps on dis-
cretionary spending; and much less severe cuts in Medicare than the summit 
budget had called for. During the process, Democrats painted Republicans as 
the party of the rich, unwilling to raise the top rate for individual income 
earners, a theme that Clinton would repeat in the 1992 presidential campaign. 
Meanwhile, Bush was unable to rebound from his decision to violate his 
promise not to raise taxes. Ironically, Speaker Foley, who said the Democrats 
would not turn the president's decision to raise taxes into a political game, 
played an important role in persuading the president to revoke his promise, 
and once Bush endorsed a tax increase, the game was on. 
When Clinton was elected president, Speaker Foley's role changed from 
representing Democrats in negotiations with the administration to delivering 
votes for the president. In 1993, the Speaker participated in a coordinated 
lobbying effort with the White House to attract wary Democrats to vote for a 
$496 billion reconciliation package of taxes and spending cuts. Up until the 
day before the vote, the leadership appeared to be short of the necessary ma-
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jority to pass the bill. Conservative Democrats wanted more spending cuts and 
fewer tax increases, and they sought a cap on entitlement spending. House 
Democrats were also worried that the proposed energy tax would be changed 
in the Senate, which was scheduled to meet after the floor vote in the House. 
After House leaders agreed to a provision to control entitlements and a 
promise by the president to reduce the energy tax and cut more entitlement 
spending, the House passed the bill by a vote of 219 to 213. As part of an 
intense lobbying effort by the White House, the Speaker helped to cool ten-
sions within the party and persuaded members to support the bill, but the key 
decisions regarding the content of the final package ultimately were made by 
the president. 
The Speaker performed a similar role when the House considered the 
conference version of the reconciliation bill. Securing approval of the 
conference bill was difficult because of the slim margin of victory on final 
passage of the House bill, the unanimous opposition of Republicans, and dif-
ferences between the House and Senate bills. The conference provided recalci-
trant members with an opportunity to shape the final details of the budget 
package before it was sent to the president, and they made the most of this 
opportunity. 44 
For members who disagreed with the conference bill, the Speaker explained 
that there was no viable alternative and that the consequences of defeat-a 
failed Democratic presidency and a shock to financial markets-were too 
onerous to bear. Yet neither the conference bill nor the arguments made by 
party leaders were enough to ensure victory. As the floor votes on the confer-
ence bill neared, passage of the bill remained in doubt. In an effort to persuade 
wary Democrats to vote for the bill, President Clinton signed two executive 
orders that ostensibly made a firmer commitment to deficit reduction (a defi-
cit reduction trust fund and an entitlement review in the event that spending 
exceeded the targets in the plan) and engaged in a final round oflast minute 
deal-making that included a promise to send Congress more spending cuts in 
a few months. Meanwhile, party leaders engaged in extensive lobbying efforts 
to pass the bill and promised members the opportunity to amend the presi-
dent's next budget package, including amendments that would cut entitle-
ments and discretionary spending and call for a constitutional amendment to 
balance the budget.45 The bill ultimately passed by a slim two-vote margin, 
218 to 216. 
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Looking to the Future: 
The Speaker and the Budget Process 
The Speaker's strategies for dealing with future challenges will depend on 
prevailing conditions and the individual Speaker. The 1994 midterm elections 
produced the first Republican majority in forty years, a new Speaker of the 
House, Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), and a return to divided party government. The 
Republicans are expected to be unified and eager to govern. In the near term, if 
previous patterns of divided government hold, we can expect Speaker Ging-
rich to play a leading role as the spokesperson of the House majority party. At 
the very least, the Republicans will propose a constitutional amendment to 
balance the budget, a key ingredient of the party's "Contract with America." 
Gingrich and the Republicans should also challenge the basic priorities of 
Clinton's budgets: the Republicans are especially likely to clash with Clinton 
over tax policy and the level of defense spending. Gingrich and the supply side 
wing of the House Republican Party will also need to deal with fiscal conserva-
tives on the Senate side. Majority Leader Bob Dole and Senate Budget Com-
mittee Chair Pete Domenici appear to be more concerned with the budget 
deficit then offering a tax break. 
As a party leader, one of Gingrich's primary challenges will be to handle 
criticism from Democrats about how Republican spending and tax priorities 
square with a promise to balance the budget. Gingrich will also need to deter-
mine how actively to engage in the budget committee's deliberations over the 
budget resolution. And he will need to decide if and when to engage in budget 
negotiations with the White House, and how to represent Republicans in those 
negotiations. Yet his biggest challenge might be adapting to the role of institu-
tional leader. Gingrich has displayed a tendency to be abrasive and confronta-
tional, a style more conductive to a minority party leader than a Speaker. As 
the Speaker, Gingrich has a responsibility to the House, as well as to the Re-
publican party. Like all speakers, Gingrich will struggle to balance party goals 
with procedural fairness. The manner in which Gingrich attempts to balance 
these competing interests will define his role in the budget process. The chal-
lenge for Gingrich might be particularly important as a restive public judges 
the performance of the new House majority party. 
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